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Part 1. On Line Survey : Looking For the Experts and 
Activists’ Opinions 
Introduction to the On Line Survey : a Quantitative Method 
This first part of the chapter is divided on 6 sections. The first section is a description of the 
population of respondents whose have answered our questionnaire. The second section is an 
analysis our respondents’ valuesystems as thay are revealed through their answers to the 
questionnaire. The third section is an analysis of our respondents’ answers to our generic 
questions concerning OST (observation and surveillance technologies). In the fourth section 
we comment on our respondents’ views on the MIAUCE scenarios that are at the core of this 
project. In section five, we comment on our respondents’ answers to our questions regarding 
the conditions of social acceptability of OST and video-surveillance systems. The the last 
section regards the regulation of the OST and video-surveillance systems considering the 
assessment made by the respondents on the existing regulation and their recommendation for 
its improvement.   
On a more practical note, as it has been commented above, it is important to remind the reader 
that the questionnaire that has served for the collect of our respondents’ opinions has been 
voluntarily orientated towards the extraction of opinions allowing for the verifying of working 
hypotheses our other enquiries on OST and video-surveillance systems have suggested as 
analytically and/or ethically important. This explains that a large majority of the questions are 
close, based on predefinite items that respondents have to assess. As such, the very wording of 
the questions submitted to our respondents is an important feature of this report. We thus 
invite the reader to refer to the questionnaire itself, added as an appendix to this document. 
This report will also make specific mention some of these questions critical for the reading of 
results in the text itself. 
The comments of the results remain very descriptive. This is due to the size of the samples 
(see section 1) which appears too small to make more analytical statistics.  
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1. The Respondents 
Two main populations have been studied through this on-line questionnaire. The first one is 
constituded of what we will qualify as ‘experts’ – this use of the term is explained in the 
coming paragraph – in observation and surveillance technologies, ‘OST’ in our text. These are 
mentioned as ‘expert respondents’ in our later text. The second group is constituted of 
militants and activists striving for the protection of fundamental rights and liberties. These are 
mentioned as ‘activists’ or the ‘activist respondents’ in the text.   
1.1. The Rational Population : the Experts  
The first population targeted by this questionnaire is that ‘experts’ in information and 
communication technologies (ICT) and OST. By ‘experts’, we mean individuals whose 
position and/or professional activity leads to their development of informed opinions about 
OST. So as to constitute our sample, we have constituted a list of 500 e-mail addresses of: 
• Scientists and engineers participating to national, European R&D projects or 
belonging to COST networks related to OST; 
• Individuals – researchers and functionaries – working for Technology Assessment 
organisms and institutions. These were identified among others through the website of 
the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment. The address of this site is as 
follows: http://www.eptanetwork.org. In this group, we have more specifically 
targeted individuals dealing with ICTs; 
• Individuals – researchers and functionaries – working for associations and organisms 
for the protection of privacy and/or the defence of fundamental rights and liberties.  
So as to maximise the number of respondents, the questionnaire has been communicated 
twice to the mailing list so compiled. Each time, we left out the questionnaire for about two 
weeks. Out of the whole of the contacted population, we have received 106 usable 
questionnaires, that is, about a 20% answering ratio, which is considered normal for the 
collect of data through on-line questionnaires. 
Our population of respondents consists of 43 women and 63 men.  
Most expert respondents are aged between 31 and 50 (51%). 23% of the other respondents are 
below 30 and 26% over 50. This leads to 77% of our expert respondents being 31 years old or 
more, which is quite coherent for a population of expert. 
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Among our expert respondents, 41% have a background in the social sciences, 37% in 
engineering and the hard and physical sciences, 18% have a Law-related profile, and 4% 
come from more diverse 
backgrounds.  
The ventilation of 
nationalities is as follows: 
32% Belgian nationals, 
29% French nationals, 8% 
Spanish nationals, 5% 
British nationals. The 
remaining 27% mostly 
originate from European countries and North America. 
We have called this population the ‘rational’ as the opinions they have expressed are informed 
by their research and professional activities. Also we have used this term to contrast this more 
‘analysing’ population against that of the more engaged active militants criticising and 
striving against OST due to concerns for the respect of fundamental rights and liberties.  
1.2. The Passionnate Population: the Activists 
Our second population is thus constituted of engaged militants criticising and striving against 
OST due to concerns and worries for the respect of fundamental rights and liberties. We 
qualify this population as ‘passionate’ due to that its opinions are motivated by a strong, 
sometimes radical as it will be clear in the analysis below, bent against OST due to the threats 
it implies for fundamental rights and liberties. While it may have been possible to blend this 
group of respondents within our expert respondents, we have chosen not to do so. Separating 
them from expert respondants indeed seemed to us interesting so as to evaluate the variations 
and divergences between our expert respondents and this population as regards to their 
opinions about OST.  
Identifying this population of activist respondents has been done in a more exploratory way. 
Lacking a basic mailing list for this type of population, we have proposed to have the 
questionnaire mentioned in a posting in the blog of the French newspaper Le Monde in May 
2009. This experiment was rendered possible thanks to some collaboration with the journalist 
in charge of the blog. The address of this blog is as follows: 
http://bugbrother.blog.lemonde.fr. This blog seemed to us interesting as it aims at questioning, 
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challenging and criticising surveillance practices and policies and is addressed mainly to 
activists and militants for the protection of fundamental rights and liberties. The questionnaire 
was put on-line on this site on May 12th, 2009, and has remained accessible till May 31st, date 
when we stopped collected data. We have collected through this blog an additional sample of 
84 usable answers.   
The activist population so contacted is made of 31% of women and 69% of men. This 
population is younger that of the expert respondents, with 44% of the population aged 
between 20 and 30, 50% aged between 31 and 50. 6% are 50 years of age or more.  As 
regards to backgrounds, the majority (56%) of this activist population are engineers and 
scientists , 23% have a background in the social sciences, and only 4% have a Law-related 
profile. Nationalities are ventilated as follows: 79% French nationals, 11% Belgian nationals, 
and 20% of various other nationalities. This majority of French nationals are due to that the Le 
Monde blog is a French-language website and thus mostly consulted by a French-language 
public.  
In the remaining of this text, we will mostly base our observations and comments on the 
answers received primarily from our population of expert respondents. The activist 
respondents will be looked at in parallel in paragraphs entitled “The Activistists’ 
Corner” when necessary and relevant, so as to comment and discuss divergences, and 
convergences too, between their positions and that of the expert respondents.   
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2. The Respondents’ Value Systems  
A first set of questions we asked our respondents was that of the values underlying the 
functioning of a ‘society wherein one feels well’.1 Their answers have allowed us, first, to 
extract an analysis of their value systems as regards to issues of wellbeing, the role and 
responsibility of the State as regards this welfare, and about the way our expert respondents 
conceives the privacy issues since they are tightly related to the OST development . Second, 
our results have also allowed us to draw a series of characteristic profiles of respondents.  
2.1. Defining ‘A Society Wherein One Feels Well’  
 
 
First as regards to our respondents’ value systems, the values necessary to a ‘society wherein 
one feels well’ are the freedom of expression, social justice and equality. When asked to range 
the values required for such as society, the freedom of expression is rated 1st in 25% of the 
cases, the need for equality as regards to rights in 15% of the cases and for social justice in 
12% of the cases. 
 
When we analyse the responses received to this question and count the number of occurrences 
of each value, freedom of expression is mentioned in 54% of the cases, social justice in 50% 
of them, and the principle of equal opportunity in 43% of the answers. We also observe that 
                                                 
1
 The original question in French was about a ‘société où l’on se sent bien’. Due to issues with the 
translation of ‘bien’ which was likely to affect and guide answers, ‘well’ was chosen as a vague, but 
probably the most neutral translation. 
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democratic participation is cited as third most important value in 18% of the cases. It thus 
emerges that democratic values, though considered highly, are seen as requiring, as a 
preamble, a set of other values looked at by respondents as more important.  
 
 
Secondly, we have extracted typical respondent profiles characterised by their value systems.  
Four main profiles have emerged.  
Combining a valuing for freedom of expression, of choice, and respect for privacy, a first 
profile is that of the respondent emphasising the importance of individual rights. Without 
speaking here of individualism in its more pejorative and criticised meaning, we propose that 
this individualist profile looks out at autonomy and individual action as important and 
necessary. Respondents fitting this profile consider freedom as the founding value for 
individual action, individuals not being due to integrate specific social groups. 
Combining a valuing of equality, social justice, and of ‘healthcare for all’, a second profile is 
that of the respondent emphasising the importance of social justice. This profile is more 
turned towards social issues, such as that of solidarity. These respondents praise the 
importance of collective actions and solidarity to regulate the society.   
Combining a valuing of material comfort and bodily safety, a third profile is that of the 
consumerist respondent who emphasises the importance of more material criteria. Freedom, 
as well as solidarity, is here lesser emphasised as important in favour of material comfort and 
personal and bodily safety.  
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Combining a valuing of democratic participation and freedom of association, our fourth, and 
last, respondent profile is that of the respondent emphasising the importance of political 
rights. Respondents fitting this profile tend to conceive a ‘society wherein one feels well’ as 
dependant on the possibility for citizens to develop political activity.  
If we look at our results with these profiles in mind, our results give the following ventilation 
for our respondents. 43% of our expert respondents seem to fit into profile emphasising the 
importance of individual rights. 37% of our expert respondents seem to fit into profile 
emphasising the importance of social justice. These are the two dominant profiles emerging 
out of our enquiries. Besides these two profiles, we also note that 11% of respondents 
emphasising the importance of political rights and 9% fit the consumerist profile . 
 
 
2.2. On Privacy 
A major notion we wished to explore through this questionnaire was that of privacy. We have 
thus confronted our respondents with contrasted conceptions of privacy, and asked their 
opinions and views on these.  
 
By combining the 4 items, we have ranged our respondents according to two constrasted 
visions of the privacy.  
One was a rather political and collective conception of privacy (items c and d.). This 
conception that we will call a politico-democratic conception of privacy, looks at privacy as a 
right to be different and to personal autonomy, and insists upon the need for the possibility to 
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autonomous development in society. In this case, the respect of privacy is a crucial condition 
for a possible emancipation within a group. 
The second was a conception of privacy – that we call protectionist – in which the protection 
of persons and their belongings was privileged (items a and b). This conception was found 
with our expert respondents privileging the protection of their intimacy and personal opinions 
as well as the protection of their belongings and personal communication devices, as their 
home, their e-mail, their phone… This conception of privacy insists upon the possibility for 
an individual to ensure the preservation and protection of information concerning him/her 
directly. 
As regards to our enquiry, 
we have noted that 38% of 
the population studies fits a 
profiles having a politico-
democratic conception of 
privacy while 62% of 
respondents display a 
protectionist conception. 
We have also noted that 
conceptions and 
understanding of privacy 
seem to depend largely upon 
the respondents’ background. In fact, 61,1% of the Law-related expert respondents contacted 
seem to participate to a politico-democratic conception of privacy while 81,1% of the 
respondents coming from scientific or engineering background rather have a protectionist 
vision of privacy. 
More in detail, among our sample, 11% of respondents are members of an association for the 
protection of privacy. Out of this, we may note that being member of such an association tend 
to come in parallel with a more politico-democratic vision of privacy. On the one hand, 
45,5% of the members of such association present this vision of privacy. On another hand, 
65,2% of respondents who are not members of such association rather present the profile of a 
protectionist vision of privacy.   
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These results show us how respondents active in Law-related domains and/or Law-related 
activities (here the example of an association for the protection of privacy) tend to participate 
to a politico-democratic conception of privacy and have a lesser restrictive and protectionist 
notion of their privacy. 
2.3. On Governance 
Another set of our questions to the respondents was related to their values in matters of 
governance and social regulation. To the question of ‘who ought to be in charge of such a 
society wherein you 
would feel well?’, 
49% of our 
respondents have 
emphasised the 
importance of the 
State as regards to this 
responsibility, while 
44% of the 
respondents consider 
this issue part of a 
good citizen’s own duties. We have thus grouped our respondents into two profiles. One 
profile is that of respondents having a ‘State-view’ way of conceiving of governance, the 
second that of respondants a citizens-view conception of governance.  
To those fitting the State-view conception of governance, democratic States and governments 
are due to playing a central role in the regulation of society. 
To those fitting the citizens-view conception of governance, the regulation of society is rather 
a bottom-up process; it implies an active participation by citizens and associations. In this 
model, the responsibility for constructing and regulating society rests with associations, non-
governmental organisations, civilian society, and citizens’ activities.  
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The Activists’ Corner: The Activist Population And Its Values 
Unlike the expert respondents, the activist respondents are keen on promoting, as  values for 
the definition of a ‘society wherein one feels well’, the values of freedom of expression, 
equality, and respect for privacy and social justice. This is quite clear in the graph below. The 
answers by the activist respondents quite reflect this population as mostly including active 
militants caring for the preservations of their rights against intrusion by observation and 
surveillance systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning privacy, the trends identified about the expert respondents are also found about 
the activist population. About 60% of these respondents display a quite protectionist 
conception of privacy, the protection of privacy implying to most the protection of the right 
to personal intimacy and personal opinions. 40% of the respondents display a more political 
or democratic conception of privacy.  
Concerning governance, a majority of 49% of our expert respondents emphasised the 
importance of the State as responsible and in charge of ensuring good governance and the 
social regulation. Again, our activist respondents similarly attribute this responsibility to the 
State.  
By contrast, the two populations are quite different as regards to their knowledge of their 
rights related to video-surveillance and privacy. This knowledge, already quite limited 
among our expert respondents, is even more limited among the activist respondents, with 
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only 19% of them claiming knowing their rights. This result may seem quite surprising for a 
more militant population in as far one knows that the Law is a crucial element towards the 
regulation of OST. 
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3. On OST And Video-Surveillance Systems 
A major part of our questionnaire consisted in exploring our respondents’ visions and 
understandings of OST and the meaning they carry for them. It seems especially important for 
us to try to understand the meaning carried by OST for our respondents as regards to their 
present state, their usefulness and their future. The rather critical opinions expressed by our 
expert respondents in their answers to our questions as well as by activist respondents – these 
are discussed below – are no doubt to put in relation with the word ‘video-surveillance’ used 
throughout the questionnaire which implies some negative visions. This effect of the ‘video-
surveillance’ term was however, only partly probably, counteracted by our introduction to the 
questionnaire. In this introduction, we explained that our concerns were with multi-modal 
observation technologies, however often better known as intelligent video-surveillance 
systems.  
 
3.1. Intrusive, Little Useful… And Yet Reassuring 
To our questions on their understandings of video-surveillance systems in modern societies, 
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respondents have been quite critical against these systems.  
Three main objections were formulated. First video-surveillance systems are seen by our 
respondents as different in 
kind from, and more 
intrusive than other more 
usual surveillance systems. 
Only 19% of our 
respondents find them 
similar. Second, these 
systems are not perceived 
as necessary. Only 17% of 
our respondents approve 
the idea of their necessity 
to tackle growing insecurity issues. Third, 49% of respondents do not see any specific 
usefulness of these systems as a means to tackle insecurity.   
These three critical objections suggest a certain aversion from our respondents to the use of 
this type of technology, even in case of insecurity problems. One ought to however be careful 
in concluding too rapidly that insecurity is no sufficient motive for the installation of video-
surveillance systems. Indeed, insecurity is a rather vague terms that can have very varied 
meanings and this is likely to have affected anwers to our questionnaire.  
Beyond this rather negative view on video-surveillance systems, it is important to remind that, 
by contrast, 47% of our respondents evaluate these systems as useful if used to assist people 
in their surveillance activities and 39% think that these may have reassuring effects. These 
two elements reflect, we would suggest a certain technological paternalism shaping our 
respondents’ views, wherein technology is entrusted with the capability to assist human 
rationality, reassure populations. This is a vision that seems shared by our expert 
respondents… with some distance however since 49% among them tend to evaluate these 
systems as useless for the prevention of insecurity.  
3.2. A Neutral Technology? 
Quite surprisingly, our expert respondents tend to display a certain technological relativism. 
Indeed to 53% among them, technology is primarily neutral, the opportunities and risks it 
generates are a matter of the aims it is used for, and the ways its usage unravels. This vision 
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on technology as socially neutral quite differs from that developed in the ‘Science, 
Technology and Society’ scholarship, where technology is conceived embodying human 
agencies and intents and as reflecting some choices that will shape up its impact on society.  
3.3. A Users Centered Technology :  Profiles And Preferences 
Many intelligent video-surveillance systems allow for the dynamic management and profiling 
of personal 
preferences, an 
issue we have 
confronted our 
respondents with 
through questions 
on profiling. Put 
briefly, profiling is 
not seen as 
efficient by our 
respondents. Only 
1% of our 
respondents 
consider that the 
functioning of profiling systems actually generates profiles corresponding to real preferences 
and opinions.  
A direct consequence of this rather categorical view is that there is – if we follow our 
respondents – a strong need for individuals to be able to control the modalities by which 
systems extract and model their preferences. On this issue, 92% of our respondents think 
having a need to access, in an unlimited way if possible, how systems build up and manage 
preferences and profile. Some detailed information on profiling per se and the implications 
thereof thus seem crucial for these systems to become more readily acceptable to our expert 
repondents. 
Also, the systems that manage preferences according to individual dynamic profiling 
techniques are perceived by 72% of our respondents as reducing possible personal choices 
and only 12% tend to consider this automatic management of preferences as allowing for 
more comfortable daily life.  
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3.4. Which Future For OST? 
 To prospect the future of OST, we have addressed a first very general question to our 
respondents.  
 
For a large majority of them (59%), OST has a promising future despite the social resistance 
and legal restrictions these systems are likely to generate. This contrasts with the 25% who 
think that its future will be limited in reason of legal restriction and social resistance. This 
majority position is really interesting to note since it means that our respondents see those 
OST systems like a technico-industrial force that a Society through its legal settlement and its 
social movement could not stop or at least negotiate.  
17 - What are the future prospects of video-
surveillance systems?
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To some extent, this result raises worries regarding the capabilities a Society could develop to 
regulate the progress of those technologies. 
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If OST is promised to a brigh future, which are the potential domains or sectors where it will 
be deployed? To support this questioning, we have suggested to our respondents a list of 
potential domains of development.  
 
Here again, for most of our respondents, OST have a bright future ahead of them. As 
illustrated in the graph below, more than 90% of the respondents foresee possibilities for 
development of OST mostly in relation to the domains of safety and security in public spaces 
and buildings, and to the containment of terrorist threats. This seems somehow paradoxical 
when one compares with the evaluation that these same expert respondents propose as regards 
to the inefficacy of these systems in matters of security and safety. It is as if these systems 
were no longer challengeable/incorporated into the normality of contemporary modern life. It 
is interesting to note here how one of the domains of application often quoted to legitimise the 
development of these technologies, that is, the assistance to elderly and handicapped people, 
is only noted by 57% of our respondents as an actual future domain of application.  
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The Activists’ Corner: The Activists On OST And Video-Surveillance Systems 
The opinions expressed by activist respondents on OST and video-surveillance systems tend 
to be similar to those by expert respondents, though often more radical, as can be seen in the 
graph below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 80% of the activist respondents find OST useless to prevent insecurity and only 
8% do find OST as equally intrusive as more traditional surveillance systems. By contrast, 
more than 50% of our respondents seem to propose that these are conceived so as to reassure 
without, however, being effective at tackling insecurity issues. Here too, some sort of 
technological paternalism seems to affect opinions but in a more critical way. Our 
respondents seem to testify of a sort of placebo social effect upon the public/populations. As 
regards to technological relativism, this group seems rather to look at OST as embodying 
and/or shaped by human agency. Only 29,7% among them consider these systems as socially 
neutral.   
As regards to profiling, by and large, activist respondents share similar objections as expert 
respondents to these practices and their implications, in a more radical way though. None of 
them consider indeed these systems as capable to extract and reflect their preferences 
correctly. As with expert respondents, more than 90% of activist respondents are keen on 
asking access and control upon the intelligibility of the systems.  
Lastly, activist respondents, like expert respondents, also point out to the securing of public 
spaces and buildings as the most likely domain of application that may in the future sustain 
the development of OST. 
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4. On The Three MIAUCE Scenarios 
This part of the report is devoted to an analysis of our respondents’ opinions as regards to the 
three scenarios central to the MIAUCE project. For each of these scenarios, we explore 
respondents’ opinions as regards to its usefulness, its necessity, and its impacts and correlated 
risks. The responses to this part of the questionnaire are quite radical and therefore have to be 
tempered by the fact the the presentations of the scenarios were very short and by then 
difficult to understand for an external respondent questioned by an ‘one way media’. For 
instance, both for the marketing qscenaroio and the WEB TV one, we did not describe all the 
proposals made by our partners to moderate their societal impacts. 
4.1. The Safety Scenario… Useful But Potentially Risky  
The first scenario we asked respondents to reflect upon is a safety-related application. It 
entails the alerting of surveillance staff when ‘abnormal’ movements are identified by the 
system. Such ‘abnormal’ bodily moves are defined through the departing from average 
expectable bodily moves, average moves around which the system is configured. This 
scenario entails the use of body-tracking technologies. For example, if someone falls at the 
bottom of the escalator of a large airport, the system will be made so as to spot out this 
incident and launch an alarm signal on the screen, which will assist swifter interventions by 
security staff. 
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The results to our questions reflect previous comments and results on the vision of video-
surveillance systems among our respondents. Indeed, 50% of respondents tend to evaluate this 
scenario as useful, which confirms our hypothesis that video-surveillance systems, as complex 
observation systems, are more likely to be seen as useful if they assist other human 
surveillance activities. Moreover, 39% of our respondents tend to propose this scenario as 
useful to prevent bodily hurt. By contrast, only 13% of respondents evaluate it as necessary. 
One ought probably to read this evaluation while taking into account the lukewarm views on 
their actual efficacy: only 39% propose that this scenario has the potential to improve 
surveillance personnel vigilance and 63% consider that it could lead to some form of 
diminished responsibilising of this same personnel. More telling are the kinds of risks 
perceived as due to this scenario. 74% of respondents propose that the technologies involved 
in this scenario could be redirected towards other aims and purposes. Further, 67% think that 
scenario and its related technology could be redirected towards unforeseen purposes may lead 
to some sort of discrimination and 55% that it could have negative fall-outs on everyday 
privacy. Compared to the other two scenarios, commented below, this first scenario seems to 
be however the one the better received by our respondents.   
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4.2. The Marketing Scenario… Useful For Marketing Practices… Putting Privacy 
At Risk  
The second scenario we asked respondents to reflect upon is a marketing-related application. 
It entails the collect of information about the behaviour of consumers, towards their own 
interest – for instance towards the automated personalising of shopping advice – and towards 
that of store managers. For instance, cameras located on product shelves would track the 
motions of consumers’ eyes and associate these with the products looked at. Shelves and sales 
can thus be optimised. 
 
As hinted above, the results from our questions are here quite clear as regards to the little 
usefulness of this scenario, among others once compared with the precedingly commented 
Safety Scenario. Only 8% evaluate this scenario as useful and only 2% defend its necessity. 
By contrast, 40% perceive how such a scenario may impact upon marketing strategies 
effectively. The rather critical evaluation of this scenario is probably to be put in relation with 
the likely threats it carries as regards to intrusion of privacy. Indeed, 83% of our respondents 
think that this scenario carries along risks for the respect of privacy, and 67% think it may 
have discriminatory side-effects. The graph below is an illustration of this critical evaluation 
of this scenario.  
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4.3. The Web-TV Scenario… A Puzzling Scenario 
The third scenario we asked respondents to reflect upon is an entertainment-related 
application. It entails the personalisation of internet television access. This system is aimed 
the identification of Web-TV users’ preferences through a Webcam-based technique for the 
facial recognition of emotions. Profiles and preferences are identified on the basis of facial 
expression of emotions, of mouse movements, and of users’ expressed choices. This way, the 
contents proposed to users may become increasingly personalised.  
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This scenario has been the most criticised out of the three. In their answers to our questions, 
only 7% of respondents have found it useful and no respondent evaluated it as necessary. 
Although this application of OST is centred on the improvement of life of its users, only 7% 
of respondents think it may bring any effective improvement. It is quite likely that these rather 
radical opinions may reflect a fear, worry, shared by 82% of respondents, regarding the 
potential risks from such technology for privacy, or, for 67% of them, regarding potential 
social discrimination side-effects. These risks are even more present as this technology is 
easily usable in quite different contexts.   
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The Activists’ Corner: The Activists On The MIAUCE Scenarios 
The opinions expressed by our expert respondents as regards to the three MIAUCE scenarios 
are also found in the answers by our activist respondents. Thus they are 35% to evaluate the 
Safety Scenario as useful, 15% for the Marketing Scenario and 9% for the Web-TV Scenario. 
Again if opinions are in principle similar, they are somehow more radical on the part of 
activist respondents. This is especially the case as regards to the risks these applications of 
OST may mean in terms of privacy intrusion. Thus more than 80% of our respondents 
consider that the Safety Scenario risks to affect the privacy, and more than 90% express these 
same worries for the two other scenarios.   
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5. Which Social Acceptability For OST? 
So as to better know the conditions for the social acceptability of OST among our 
respondents, we have asked them a series of questions aiming at highlighting their views on 
three issues, the possibility to influence the design of OST and how, the issue of OST 
observing them in their routine life, and their opinions as regards to the future of OST. We 
summarise below the results of our analysis of our respondents’ responses to this questioning. 
5.1. You As Designer Or As Decider Of OST 
The first set of questions we wish to discuss was concerned with the respondents’ putative 
opinions if in the hypothetical position of being the designer or decider for future OST. We 
wished to see what they were ready to accept about the future system under design.  
 
 
As the graph below shows, if the observation of bodily features is somehow still seen as 
acceptable for 26% of our respondents, as well as the possibility for crossing data across 
various systems, for 18% among them, certain elements are simply seen unacceptable by than 
90% of our population. 
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What is at stake here is the intrusive and normative characters of the technology, especially so 
as only 6% of our respondents think they may accept a likely actual influence upon users. 
Another major issue is that of the possibility of collecting data without the informed consent 
of the people concerned. Only 7% of our respondents seem ready to authorise such collecting 
possibility. A third issue has also attracted our attention, the fact that only 6% of our 
respondents would be ready to entrust the management of future systems to private agents 
and operators. This distrust towards private agents and operators also arises other 
questioning. It is as if our respondents would trust better public authorities. This seems 
paradoxical, if one notes too that most legal system aiming at the protection of privacy have 
been originally created to impede the intrusion by the State in the sphere of privacy. It is less 
so, however, if one takes into account how privacy intrusions and high performance of data 
collecting systems are maybe no more to be found in the public but rather in the private 
sector. For instance, 53% of our respondents do consider that the major threats for privacy 
mostly originate from the private firms when only 28% of them turn their regards towards the 
public authorities. 
5.2. You… As Observed Individual 
A second set of questions we asked our respondents was concerned with their everyday living 
surrounded with cameras, in public spaces as well as private ones too.  
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On this issue, as illustrated in the graph below, respondents have emphasised several factors 
conditionning, in their opinion, the social acceptability of the usage of OST. The first of these 
factors is the need for transparency, transparency about the later usages of collected images 
and data. This reflects a clear claim for a complete information on the intelligibility  of the 
systems in exploitation and on the agenda pursued by systems managers and operators. Thus 
we note that only 2% of our respondents would tolerate not knowing the usage of the data 
collected on their behalf and 3% ignoring the identity of the systems operator. The 
combination of the omnipresence of cameras with their invisibility is pointed at by our 
respondents as also very problematic. Indeed, only 5% of our respondents accept the 
observation of their daily routine by omnipresent, and often invisible, cameras. This is 
confirmed by the difficulty resented by 91% of the respondents with feeling observed in 
private and public spaces. As a last point, as already commented earlier about, the potential 
normative role of OST, of which usage can be extended towards decision-making, is also a 
major issue. Only 9% of respondents would agree on accepting this development.  
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As seen here above, a major issue regarding the social acceptability of OST for our 
respondents is that of the transparency of systems, that is, their requirement for some 
information about the systems, their usage, their operators and managers, and the overall 
intelligibility of its process.  
This requirement for transparency and intelligility of the systems is very well shown by the 
results collected to the question about the impact of current information made on the presence 
of cameras, being in public as private spheres.  
 
The responses to this question show the general non satisfaction of our experts regarding the 
information at disposal to the public concerning the presence of cameras. Based on these 
results, one can conclude that the current information is far from being assesd as responding 
to the requirements pointed out by our experts regarding the intelligibility and the 
transparency of the system.  
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When asked, in more general terms, if they think that they are sufficiently informed about 
OST, answers are quite telling. As illustrated in the graph below, only 4% of our respondents 
evaluate the information disseminated by systems operators as sufficient. This fits very well 
with the 
previous 
observation 
regarding the 
information at 
disposal about 
the presence of 
the cameras.  
More 
generally, 
respondents 
also think that 
people is insufficiently informed on OST. According to them, such information is mostly 
disseminated by associations (30% of our respondents), the medias (20% of our respondents). 
Public authorities as ‘academic’ sector, in this specific matter, seem to be seen as quite too 
discreet at disseminating such information.  
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5.3. You And Your Acceptability Of OST 
A last set of questions was about the kind of systems our respondents would, in their current 
understandings, agree to tolerate and accept.  
 
81% of our respondents highlight their tolerance for the usage of OST provided that the aims 
and purposes pursued thereby appears to them as legitimate. Out of the list of purposes 
proposed by us to respondents, three emerge as legitimate for less than 50% of the 
respondents: the protection of children (48% of respondents), the securing of public spaces 
(46% of respondents), and the containment of terrorist threats (45% of our respondents). The 
identification of these three purposes as legitimate for a part of our pouplation raises up the 
paradox of our respondents’ ambivalent position to OST, that is, their critiques of their 
practical inefficacy and uselessness at tackling insecurity issues and their habits to 
nevertheless subscribe to the trust these with such protecting capabilities. Lastly, we also note 
that more than half of our respondents did not identify among the purposes we proposed them 
any that they would evaluate as legitimate. These results invite to further public debating on 
the purposes and agencies underlying OST so as to identify the legitimising criteria that 
would allow their development in the respect of a democratic society.  
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The Activists’ Corner: The Activists On The Social (Un-)Acceptability Of OST  
As with the issues commented earlier of value systems, perception of OST, and the MIAUCE 
scenarios, the activist respondents appear to propose the same kind of opinions as our expert 
respondents, but again in a more radical way. As developer or designer, 92% among them 
think they would refuse contributing to the development of systems aiming at the observation 
of personal bodily features and characteristics. Similarly, 89% of our activist respondents 
would refuse to cross-examine data and information coming from different sources. The 
intrusive and normative character of OST is also received by criticisms from 99% among 
them, who would refuse on any decision being made on the sole basis of information 
collected through OST. Lastly, activist respondents seem to share our expert respondents’ 
distrust of private operators, with 99% among them refusing to contribute to the 
development of systems if entrusted to such private operators.  A difference does exist 
between our two populations regarding the main threats to privacy: when the expert 
population considers for 53% of them that the threat comes mostly from private firms and 
only 28% from the State, the proportion is just the reverse here with a large part of activists -
47%- that considers that State as a major source of threats. This is understandable when 
considering the nature of the BLOG that has supported the posting of the on line 
questionnaire to the activists and which is very orientated to the critiques of the large public 
surveillance systems. 
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As regards to issues raised by being observed, the activist respondents are quite critical of 
observation and surveillance practices. The whole of the population does not tolerate being 
observed, and more than 97% among them refuse systems that would not be wholly 
transparent concerning the possible usage of data as well as the systems’ operators and 
managers. Systems that would allow making decisions based on the collected images and 
data are equally criticised. In brief, the activist respondents do refuse situations wherein they 
are not informed about the purposes, agencies and readability of the systems and their 
outputs. This is also confirmed by the two next results : 70% out of them do consider that 
being informed of the presence of a camera is not reassuring them and only 1,2%, as shown 
by the graph below, find that people are sufficiently informed and aware of OST by the 
manger of the system.  
 
Quite interestingly, when asked to develop prospective considerations on OST, we have 
noted that only 61% of this population would agree to tolerate future developments of these 
systems even if the underlying purposes for such development were deemed legitimate. This 
reflects and confirms the rather critical and cautious opinion of this population on systems 
that they feel as threatening fundamental rights and liberties. As regards to the purposes that 
may be deemed as legitimate, the only one that emerges as justifiable is that of the protection 
of children, accepted as such by 34% of the activist respondents. Again this ranked lower 
than among the expert respondents. 48% among them deemed this purpose as legitimate. 
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6. Regulation 
 
The last section concerns the regulation of the OST. This regulation is a crucial issue when 
considering the social and ethical impacts those systems can have on our everyday life.  
 
In this section, we will first question our respondents regarding the need (or not) of public 
debate regarding the deployment of an OST system in a public as in a private space. 
Secondly, we will question our respondents on their responsibilities regarding this regulation: 
what are they prepare to do to defend their rights and positions when facing OST. In the third 
and last part, we will address the question regarding the specific roles and responsibilities of 
the public bodies in charge of the protection of privacy.  
 
6.1. Public Debate: An Urgent Democratic Requirement 
 
A first very general question regards the need to set up public debates regarding the OST.  
 
 
 
 
As shown by the following graph, a very large majority of our respondents, 92%, point out the 
need for such public debate. This important majority indicate well that the OST issues and 
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regulations need to be urgently supported by democratic deliberation involving all the 
concerned stakeholders.  
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What should be the scope of this public debate? For 51% of the respondents it is the decision 
itself to install or not a system of OST that should be democratically deliberate through public 
debate. 29% consider that it is mostly the usage of the OST and its modalities of exploitation 
that should be at stake in such public debate. And a majority of the reminding 20% underline 
in textual comments that for them both of these scopes are crucial to be democratically 
deliberated.   
To validate these first results, we have put our respondents in situation of facing a deployment 
of an OST system in order to better approach their visions of the needed regulation.  Two 
questions were raised: one regards the deployment of OST in public space, the other its 
deployment in private space. Regarding the regulation of this decision, three possibilities were 
suggested to the respondent: to leave the decision to the public or private body in charge of 
the system, to leave the decision to the citizens or the consumers concerned by the system or 
to entrust this decision to public authorities in charge of the privacy protection. The results do 
confirm the previous trends even if they are less radical than when related to a general 
statement. 
First of all, as shown by the graphs below, only a minority of our respondents are prepared to 
leave this decision in the sole hands of the operator being public (37%) or private (24%).
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For a deployment in a public space, most of them (65%) consider that the population should 
be consulted and partner of the decision through the organisation of a public debate.  
Logically, this claim for public debate is less marked for a private installation (42%) since in 
this case both the scope of the ‘public’ and the legitimate basis to organise such a public 
debate are difficult to approach.  
The role of the public authority in charge of the protection of privacy rights appears very 
crucial or critical for our respondents, since it is required by 55% of them for a deployment in 
a public space and for 60% in a private space.  Interesting to note is the difference between 
the two profiles we have drawn regarding the concept of privacy of our respondents. For 
instance, the protectionists are much more in favour of a regulation exercised by the authority 
in charge of the protection of the privacy rights than the politico-democratics who consider 
that it is primarily a question of public debate.  
 
6.2. Citizens’Actions : a Constructive Sense of Resistance 
 
This part does concern the actions and responsibilities our respondents do consider the 
citizens should take in charge in order to defend their position and protect their privacy in 
relation with OST’s development. Those questions aim to understand the concept our 
respondents have about the citizens’ responsibilities when facing social and ethical issues 
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raised by OST. In order to not approach this responsibility too theoretically, here again we put 
our respondents in the citizen’s situation. 
The first question was about what they are prepared to manifest their disapproval against the 
presence of OST systems.  
 
  
 
First of all a very large majority of them are ready to express this disapproval since 82% of 
them respond positively. This seems to mean that people – at least our experts- do not intend 
to stay passive or inactive when facing issues or problems raised by OST systems.  
The second part of this question was about the means and the ways our respondents would 
mobilise to express their position. As shown in the graph below, a large majority of our 
respondents do mobilise what we could qualify means of constructive or positive resistance to 
contrast to means of defensive or negative resistance.  For instance, 84% of them are reday to 
sign a petition to express collectively their position. But more significantly, 82% of them 
would call an organism in charge of the protection of the privacy rights. This important 
percentage shows also the critical role those organisms have when considering the wek means 
they have at disposal in a majority of European countries. It seems also interesting to point out 
that our respondents are for more than 60% of them ready to engage themselves more actively 
in order to defend their positions either by joing an association for the protection of privacy 
rights or by manifesting publicly their opinion. All those percentages give some empirical 
evidence to the critical issue that OST represents for our respondents and therefore their 
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willingness to involve themselves in a public deliberation or questioning of those 
technologies. By contrast with this constructive resistance or attitude, the different ways or 
means more defensive to prevent them to be observed by OST seem less favoured by our 
respondents. In fact, even if 48% of them should seek to avoid places wherein these 
observation systems are installed, they are less than 20% prepared to take active measure to 
avoid OST systems as disguising themselves (26%) or sabotaging OST (18%).  
 
 
To organise those actions and to legitimate them, people are supposed to know the legal frame 
that regulates the privacy’s protection. It is therefore interesting to question our respondents 
about their personnal knowledge of this legal frame. The results are quite telling: 46% claim 
having some knowledge of this frame, while 54% ignore it. This result is rather surprising for 
our population of expert respondents about whom one may have arguably presupposed some 
culture of their legal rights. If one looks more in details at the profile of those claiming to 
know their rights, we note that this category includes 83% of the Law-related expert 
respondents, though 17% of these expert respondents admit not knowing their rights.  
 
 
 
 41 
6.3. Role of the Public Bodies in Charge of the Protection of Privacy: Critical 
Expectations 
As we have seen before, the legitimacy of the public bodies in charge of the protection of 
privacy and its critical role for OST’s regulation are widely confirmed by our respondents. 
This general trend is confirmed by the fact that for a very large majority of our respondents, 
as shown on the graph below, the protection of citizen’s privacy is mainly a matter of the 
public responsibility of the State.  
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If the public authorities in charge of the privacy’s protection are highly legitimated by our 
respondents, it is interesting to question them first of all about their personnal knowledge of 
those bodies and secondly about their perceptions of the social usefulness of those bodies.   
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The results are telling. First of all, they show that 66% of our respondents have an effective 
knowledge of public bodies entrusted with privacy protection. This means also that one third 
of them do not have this knowledge, which is a quite high rate when considering that the 
respondents are experts.   
31 - Do you have knowledge of independent 
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Their opinion regarding the usefulness of such bodies testifies of  large social expectations 
regarding such bodies. All the suggested items received more than 80% positive responses. 
The hightest rates do concern the protective role of the privacy bodies as protecting citizens 
and ensuring the respect of laws and regulations. But still, 81% of our respondents do 
consider that such bodies have also a more active or political vocation by promoting public 
debating.  
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All those comments claim for a reinforcement of the responsibilities and means of the public 
bodies in charge of the citizens’ privacy protection. They also indicate a clear demand of our 
respondents for the setting up of democratic debates regarding the policies and the practices 
of OST in our Society.  
 44 
The Activists’ Corner: The Activists On The Regulation Of OST  
The activist respondents appear to propose the same kind of opinions as our expert 
respondents, but again in a more radical way. First of all, as far as public debate is concerned, 
97% of them do consider that the installation of  OST system should be submitted to a large 
public debating and according to them, this debate should primarily concern the decision of 
the installation rather than its modalities of use and exploitation.   
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Placing in the concrete case of the installation of OST systems in public or private spheres, 
the activists seem however better to entrust this decision to public bodies in charge of 
privacy’s protection rather than to support this decision by a public debate with the concerned 
stakeholders.  
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When questioning them about the different ways to express their disapproval against the 
presence of surveillance systems, they also claim for different actions belonging to what we 
have called ‘the positive or constructive resistance’ as calling at the organism in charge of the 
privacy’s protection, or signing a petition, or manifesting publicly their opinion. However, by 
comparison to the experts’ population, a greater percentage of them could involve themselves 
in more defensive strategies as disguising them or sabotaging the OST system. This is quite 
congruent with the ‘nature’ of the activists’ population.  
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More telling is the very low percentage of them showing a personal knowledge of the 
privacy’s protection legal frame that could support their actions and claims: they are only 
19% who tell having this knowledge.  If this knowledge is still low for what we could 
consider as a very concerned population, one could be really worried about the state of 
knowledge of the population in general… This claims clearly in favour of a wider 
popularization of the legal frame in order to reinforce the capabilities of all the stakeholders to 
participate actively to the democratic reflexion about those technologies.  
As the experts, the activists’ population do consider for a very large majority of 78,5% of 
them that the protection of the privacy’s rights is mainly of the responsibility of the State. 
This is a bit maybe paradoxal since this population consideres at the msame time that the 
major threats for their privacy come from the State… But their responses indicate, as for the 
experts’population, important expectations regarding the public bodies in charge of this 
protection.  This is well pointed out by the graph below showing that the social usefulness of 
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such body is proven by more than 90% of them for its three traditional roles: protecting 
citizens’ rights, promoting legislative changes, ensuring the respect of the law.  
 
 
 
.  
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
The results presented in this section could appear quite black and pessimist for those who 
involve plitically or technologically in OST systems.  
First of all, we would again point out that this pessimism is somehow generated by the term 
‘video-surveillance’ used in the writings of the questionnaire even if we define cautiously the 
systems targetd by the questionnaire all along it… If ‘video-surveillance’ is very commonly 
known by our questioned populations, it is also widely negatively connoted in its general 
meaning and especially regarding the threats for the privacy.  
But, on the other hand, from a democratic point of view, those cautious opinions testified by 
our respondents are quite heartening concerning their willingness to set up these OST systems 
on legitimate and democratic bases. From this point of view, the general trends shown by 
those results give some empirical evidence about the need to better inform people about the 
issues of those OST systems and to democratically deliberate about their diffusion in the 
Society.  
Several recommendations emerge from this survey.  
General Awareness 
First of all, we can point out a real need for a wider popularization of information concerning 
OST systems. This information does concern first of all the general intelligibility of those 
systems and their related issues for the Society. This is dramatically raised by the very low 
percentage of respondents who consider being sufficiently informed about OST. On this 
information’s front, we have seen that the media seem the more active. This means at the 
same time that there is large avenue for campaign of awareness led either by the public 
authorities as by the academic world.  
Legal Awareness 
This lack of information does concern also the legal frame that regulates the privacy rights 
and more generally the OST systems. To some extent, this legal frame remains very obscure 
for our populations and this result is quite worrying when one considers the backgrounds of 
our populations and their involvement into the domain either as experts or as activists. This 
claims in favour of paedagogical work to popularize those frames amongst the citizens. The 
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clear explaination of these legal frames and their appropriation by the population is critical for 
the reinforcement of the collective intelligence and therefore for the development of a 
democratic society based on matured and deliberated decisions.  
Reinforcement of the Assets of the Public Authorities in Charge of privacy 
Protection 
The public authorities responsible for protecting the individual rights as regard the privacy 
and more generally the civil liberties are for our respondents a critical node for the regulation 
of the OST systems. This node as deployed in most of the European countries is suffering of 
lack of human means and of authorities to substain the wide expectations people have about 
its role. It claims both for reingforcement of their means and authorities but also for 
innovation in their organizational settings in order to make them more accessible for an 
effective protection of the individual rights of the citizens. 
 
Intelligibility of the OST Systems 
As raised by our respondents, if the informed consent is a basic condition to socially accept 
the OST’s systems,  the current signalling of camera presence appears not sufficient to 
reassure and to inform the population about the purposes, the management and the 
functionalities of the OST systems. For most of our respondents, those systems have to be 
more readable or transparent regarding their finalities, their processes and their 
managers/owners. This transparency is for our respondents one of the most critical condition 
to make OST systems socially acceptable. This requirement for transparency can be red as a 
political demand of a balancing of powers between the system and the concerned population.  
 
Accessibility to the OST Systems 
The accessibility of the systems and more precisely the right for people to have access to the 
data collected on them and processed about them but also to correct those data in case of 
misunderstanding is also a critical factor to make those OST systems socially acceptable for 
our population. This claim has a very strong social meaning when considering the very low 
trust our populations have in the profiles and preferences generated by those systems.  Her 
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again, this requirement must be red as a political demand for a fair balancing of powers 
between humans and systems.  
Legitimacy of the OST’s Finality 
Setting up OST’s systems on legitimate finalities is also a major condition for the social 
acceptability of those systems. This is well pointed out by our respondents. However, those 
legitimate finalities appear difficult to identify… This is well addressed by our respondents 
when suggesting them some commonly programmed finalities (as protection of children, fight 
against terrorism, etc.). This is also dramatically demonstrated when considering the very 
pessimist assessment of the MIAUCE scenarios. This difficulty raises a major question 
regarding the social usefulness of those technologies seen by our respondents as reassuring 
the population but as not having effective impacts on the security, as assisting staff in their 
surveillance activities but at the same time as diminishing their sense of responsibility.   
This question of legitimacy claims both for being more innovative regarding the social 
directions that could take those technologies but also for collective and democratic 
deliberation to assess the legitimacy of those finalities.  
 
Democratic deliberation 
All the results gathered by this survey demonstrate a critical need for the organisation of 
democratic deliberation about OST systems. This need does concern both the societal issues 
that those technologies raise for the Society and the specific deployment of such systems in 
our every day life. As well pointed out before, this deliberation could foster the legitimacy of 
the settlement of those technologies in our Society but also generate a collective intellgence 
regarding domains and issues that those technologies could support.  
The question raised by the democratic deliberation regards its organisation and the relevant 
process that should support it. Through the MIAUCE project, we have tested some patterns 
for this democratic process. They are fully detailed in the chapter 1 of this report.  
 
 
 50 
Part 2 : Focus Groups: Looking for ‘Majorities’, ‘Common’ 
and ‘Precarious’  
 
Introduction to Focus Group : a qualitative method 
This first part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Focus Groups organized by 
University of Namur in 2008-2009. The major aim of a Focus Group is to provide information 
about preferences and values of targeted citizens (8 to 20) on particular topics. Given presence 
of a moderator, a focus group is a kind of focused interview which undertook a discussion 
group. 
Focus Group is a qualitative method very helpful in order to assess the nature and intensity of 
stakeholders’ concerns and values about the deliberated issues.  
We have organised six Focus Groups, hereafter ‘FG’, in French-speaking Belgium, each of 
which was structured as follows.2 The first theme was that of the values underlying ‘a society 
wherein one feels good’, the conditions required for its existence and its constraints and 
limitations. The second theme was the three MIAUCE scenarios, which were submitted to an 
assessment, covering issues of their social acceptability. Thirdly, and lastly, participants were 
asked to elaborate on some potential recommendations to EU authorities.  
 
MIAUCE Focus Group’s structure 
 
1. Brainstorming about the conceptions of a « well-being society » 
- How do we define a well-being society (3 criteria) 
- What are the conditions allowing a well-being society? 
- What’s against a well-being society? 
2. MIAUCE’s project presentation 
- MIAUCE’s project (governance, partners, scenarios, technologies) 
- Security Scenario : description, objectives, technologies 
- Marketing Scenario: description, objectives, technologies 
- Web-TV Scenario: description, objectives, technologies 
3. Assessing the scenario 
- What are the negative / positive consequences implied by each scenario? 
- Is it a useful / helpful scenario? 
- Is it a necessary scenario? 
- What kinds of public do the scenario and the technologies concern? 
- What kinds of places do the scenario and the technologies concern? 
                                                 
2
 Cfr the appendices to this report that include the powerpoints prepared for the FG and the detailed reports that 
ensued.  
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4. What kind of social acceptability? 
-Does the scenario satisfy to the requirements of: 
Justice? 
Equality? 
Freedom? 
(please explain your choice) 
- May the scenario discriminate? If yes/no, why? 
- May the scenario weaken social links? If yes/no, why? 
- How do you connect the requirements of a “well-being society” and the scenario 
contingencies? 
- What kinds of ruse or resistance can you imagine concerning the scenario? 
5. Recommendations 
- What kind of recommendations would you address: 
- Concerning the public funding of these technologies? 
- Concerning the social and legal responsibility of the public decision-makers? 
- Concerning the development of the technology? 
 
1. The Participants: Majoritary, Common and Precarious 
The participants selected for these FC were, first, a group of about 20 trade union workers 
participating to courses at the Ecole syndicale of the CNE, the Centrale Nationale des 
Employés, second, a dozen followers of French classes at the CIRE, the Coordination et 
Initiative pour Réfugiés et Etrangers (French being a foreign language for the participants to 
these classes), third, the members of the Namur Rotary Club, and, fourthly, a dozen of prison 
staff and a dozen of prisoners of Arlon prison.   
1.1. The Typology : Justification 
We propose to use a typology inspired by analyses by Le Blanc, Vies ordinaires, Vies 
précaires, and by Deleuze and Guattari, authors of A Thousand Plateaus, which suggests to 
categorise our sample as made of people ‘precarious’, ‘common’ and ‘majorities’. We will 
look at the prisoners and French classes followers as the ‘precarious’ category. The 
penitentiary staff and the trade union workers will be looked as the ‘common’ category, and 
the Rotary Club members as the ‘majorities’.    
Through these FC, we have been looking towards highlighting the social and economic 
tensions separating ‘majorities’, ‘common’ and ‘precarious’ in the French-speaking Belgian 
society. Our main problem following on from the on-line survey was about who would 
arguably be identified as falling under one or the other label. The questionnaire was indeed 
insufficient to reveal these groups and make them express their opinions. On the one hand, the 
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‘precarious’ were generally a disseminated category, most likely to be lack an easy access to 
internet and on-line resources - the Digital Divide indeed often leads to difficult access to, and 
use of computerised interfaces and internet. On the other hand, the literature survey on the 
acceptability potential of the MIAUCE scenarios – realised as part of the second deliverable 3 
– also led us to the realisation of video-surveillance systems leading out to exclusion 
phenomena. Some of the persons filmed in the classic situation of video-surveillance usage in 
public space may suffer from later discriminations based on their skin colours, gender, age 
and/or clothing. In this sense, video-surveillance usage accentuates discrimination. The 
‘precarious’ being characterised by a negative, disqualified, excluded social identity, it thus 
seemed appropriate to use the FC method to obtain opinions out of ‘precarious’, ‘common’ 
and ‘majorities’.  
1.2. Presentation of the Panels 
The FG methodology implies the contacting of people sharing specific characteristics and 
common interests, the so-called ‘stakeholders’. We consider as the ‘majorities’ those whom 
Deleuze and Guattari categorise as the ‘standard/norm’,4 that is those serving as reference, 
example of social normality; that means classically the white man, the ‘WASP’, the ‘upper 
middle class’ individual. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari indeed develop a 
theory of minority politics wherein majority and minority are assessed using quantitative 
arguments but rather through an exploration of power distribution in society. In their words, 
this means that:      
“When we say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the 
determinationof a state or a standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the 
smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white-man, adult-male, etc. Majority implies a state 
of domination, not the reverse. It is not a question of knowing whether there are mosquitos or 
flies than men, but of knowing how “man” constituted a standard in the universe in relation to 
which men necessarily (analytically) form a majority” 5  
This approach of looking out for the ‘common’ and ‘’precarious’ was part of our will to 
highlight the existence of a public, of an audience to the MIAUCE mutli-modal video-
surveillance scenarios. This was inspired by our reading of the literature, which seemed to us 
to suggest the targeting of fragile and economically and socially unstable population groups. 
                                                 
3
 See the surveillance studies : www.surveillance-and-society.org 
4
 Deleuze et Guattari, « A Thousand Plateaus », London : the Athlone Press, 1988, p. 291. 
5
 Idem, p. 291. 
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Collecting opinions on the part of these groups meant for the possibility to let another kind of 
public, usually deprived of public visibility and expression, to let its opinions known. The FC 
were in this sense oriented towards revealing communities sharing specific interests as 
regards to technologies. Towards this purpose we have chosen to visit prisons, where we 
talked with prison staff and prisoners, to contact refugees, and trade union workers. To sum 
up, it was so as to show off the existence of a silent public to the three MIAUCE scenarios, 
and provide alternative discourses on social acceptability that the FC were organised.  
According to Le Blanc, the ‘common’ [ordinaire] is an individual who constantly negotiates 
with social norms so as to maintain a decent way of life. This objective of a decent way of life 
is promoted by the author in his 2007 Vies ordinaires, Vies précaires, where he argues for 
‘caring’ politics, inspired by the feminist ethics of ‘care’. The ‘ordinaire’ has a social 
function, among others through his participation to the workforce, to consumption practices, 
etc. Norms, rules, social conventions are taken into account, ingested by the ‘ordinaire’, and 
his/her ordinary life is characterised by the latter ingestion. The freedom of the ‘ordinaire’, the 
white man says, consists in plyaing with and against these norms, rules and conventions that 
are as much qualifications. It is thus that one becomes equipped to explore the 
prevcariousness and instability of a disqualification. In this category of ‘common’, we find the 
CNE Ecole syndicale participants, made of union trade workers (among others out of the 
distribution and transports sectors) and the prison staff at Arlon. In some ways, this 
‘ordinaire’ category thus includes workers to whom the ‘Marketing’ and ‘Safety’ scenarios 
are full of meaning as regards to their professional activity. This special meaning of safety, 
and surveillance technologies, in particular was quite clear in relation to security and safety 
staff, e.g. prison staff. Union trade workers were on their part quite sensitive to issues related 
to the ‘Marketing’ scenario.    
The ‘précaire’ individual, in a quite contrasted way, is rather best defined by his/her 
invisibility and inexistence in the democratic social system, leading out to a trend in studies 
devoted to the ‘subalterns’. Can Subalterns Speak? is a founding text  of the so-called 
‘Subaltern Studies’ that attempt to give space for the expression of those lacking it. In this 
sense, feminist studies have also claimed on the need of solicitude, calling for caring politics, 
on the need to look for and care for exception, e.g. Butler, and the rights of minority, e.g. 
Deleuze and Guattari.6 The ‘précaire’ is one who exists despite being the antithesis of social 
                                                 
6
 Strictly speaking Deleuze and Guattari are not feminist writers. What we mean here is that they 
display the same kinds of concerns than feminist authors.  
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normality, the one whose career has emerged despite his/her not contributing to performance 
normativity, or profitability, etc. As the prisoners in Arlon answered when asked “what is a 
society in which one feels well?,” “why asking this question? We are not part of society; we 
are outside of it.” This acute consciousness of being excluded, out of the game is hared by 
other groups, such as refugees, jobseekers, and refers to the social normal imperatives such as 
wealth, security and safety, freedom. The ‘précaire’ is out of the game, beyond the reach of 
power, and deprived of public voice. This inclusion of the ‘précaire’ is thus a reflection of one 
of our desires to include in our exploration of the voices of an alternative public on 
acceptability issues. Following on Le Blanc, speaking for the ‘precarious’ is an endeavour of 
mutual translation between the language of the ‘precarious’ and that of the ‘majorities’.  As he 
expresses himself:  
“Trying to fix the concept of precariousness, it would be, beyond the double effort of 
translation – translation of political words in the precarious langage, translation of precarious 
langage in the philosophical langage-, a contribution to the restoration of the precarious 
voices, too rapidly removed from the concert of the modern democracies. “ 7 
As such we wished too that the public we were creating would include some of these invisible 
individuals, these ‘useless’ individuals excluded by society. More in practice, our work, 
though using the methodology of FG, has involved a rather limited number of applications. In 
some ways, thus, our results only have a limited, mostly exemplative, value. They 
nevertheless are a useful complement to the on-line questionnaire, and have at the least the 
merit to allow for the collection of opinions of well-focused social groups. Also, we also 
wished to collect the opinions of two additional groups, that of the young individuals (up to 
25 years old) and that of the elderly people (aged of 60 years or more). These two groups, 
despite several attempts on our part, have declined our invitation to participate to a FG. 
Mostly they did show little interest in video-surveillance issues. Specifically, no member of 
the Fédération des Seniors, where we disseminated the invitation through the monthly 
journal, has manifested any interest in the FC, and students at the Faculté d’informatique of 
the University of Namur, where we are based, have similarly not shown off interest for the 
FG. Could it be that this lack of interest is witnessing of a relative of interest for 
videosurveillance and privacy issues among the youngest and eldest layers of Belgian 
society? The question remains open but it seems in the first instance that this may mean that 
these two groups feel relatively little concerned by these problematics. Such reflections are 
                                                 
7
 Le Blanc, G., Vies ordinaires, Vies précaires, Paris, Seuil, 2007, p.18. My translation. 
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however to be formulated carefully: most members of the Rotary Club were indeed all quite 
older, being all about 60 years of age or more.    
2. The values : Consensus and Divergences 
2.1. The ‘Precarious’ 
THE PANEL 
The CIRE, the Coordination et Initiative pour Réfugiés et Etrangers as mentioned above, is 
an assciation (ASBL) based in Brussels. The FG was organised with the participation of about 
10 foreign students learning French at the Ecole de Français Langue Etrangère. There was an 
equal proporition of men and women. Students were between 25 and 45 years of age.  
Arlon prison is a medium-sized men’s prison, counting between 120 and 130 prisoners. The 
institution includes a temporary arrest section destined to accused individuals, and one more 
proper prison part where convicts are being kept. Dating back to 1867, the facility is rather 
decayed. The 7-people group is exclusively made of man, aged between 25 and 45 years.  
THE VALUES EXPRESSED 
When asked about the values of a ‘society wherein one feels well’, the ‘precarious’ emphasise 
the importance of human capital. Values as security and safety, equality, tolerance and 
congeniality and conviviality are put forward as crucial. If safety and security and freedom 
have rather extended meaning for this category, equality is, by contrast, rather understood 
rather narrowly as also implying the possibility of jealousies, and temptations for theft, and 
delinquent for instance. Tolerance is understood rather broadly, and implies the acceptance of 
differences; and conviviality is the quest for harmonious relationships between individuals. 
What sustains this ‘society wherein one feels well’ are the traditional values of the ‘active 
social State’ prmoting and providing for healthcare, education, social solidarity, employment, 
and vital needs. The countervalues and issues threatening such society are those of violence, 
corruption, unemployment, social and economic gaps. 
2.2. The ‘Common’ 
THE PANEL 
The ‘common’ panel is made of students of the Ecole Syndicale of the CNE. It is a mixed 
group of about 20 people aged between 30 and 50. We also include in this category the Arlon 
staff prison, all men, aged between 20 and 60.  
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THE VALUES EXPRESSED  
The most cited values are those of security and safety, respect, fulfilling of vital needs, e.g. 
healthcare, minimal comfort, the ability to relate to a group, that is, not being isolated or 
lonely, social justice and stable employment.  Education, respect for the Law and rules and 
regulations and a relatively important policing force are also mentioned as ingredients for a 
‘society wherein one feels well’. Contrary ingredients are identified as potentially coming 
from unemployment over-consumpution habits, and the lack of social contacts.    
2.3. The ‘Majorities’ 
THE  PANEL 
We contacted the Gembloux Rotary Club – the Rotary Club is a charity society gathering 
liberal professionals (as physicians, lauwers, retailers, etc.) but also managers of public ans 
private firms and teachers of which activities include the organising to social events such as 
conferences, social events, and also the sponsoring of further education (travel bursaries). The 
aim of this group is the networking but also the financial support to some acritative 
associations.   Participants were 12 aged between 45 and 65. 
THE VALUES 
The values pointed at in this group of ‘majorities’ as regards to a ‘society wherein one feels 
well’ are those of freedom, understood as the freedom of association and movement, , family 
values, and security and safety. What allows and sustains this society are values of work 
endurance and State laws and regulations. Violence, lack of respect for rules and regulations, 
especially in youngesters’ education, mafias and corruption are highlighted as antithetical to 
such a society.  
2.4. Consensus and Divergences: Values vs. Meaning(s) of Security and Safety, 
Freedom, and Respect 
Unlike what may have been expected, some values have emerged out of the FC as common to 
all our categories of ‘precarious’, ‘common’ et ‘majoritraires’ to refer to to a ‘society where in 
one feels well’, those of security and safety, freedom, and respect. These three values seem 
unanimiously shared. We need however to add a few remarks. First, freedom and respect are 
mentioned by all categories but are rather polysemic, and the most likely to diverging 
meanings. By freedom and respect, it is most of all the wide domain of privacy and intimacy 
that is enacted. Respect for freedom to move, associate, choose, prefer, although formulated 
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by allcategories of participants to our panels, does not equate with individuals all participating 
to the same social, economic and political exchequer. It is for exemple this generic notion of 
freedom that is invoked by all when commenting on the dangers of profiling enacted by the 
‘Marketing’and Safety and Security’ scenarios for instance. 
This same remark on issues of polysemy can also be expressed about the value of security and 
safety. Safety and security are indeed words of which meaning change quite severely if 
invoked in contexts of terrorism in public spaces, or risks of accidents or of personal 
agression. What is safety and security about? About reassuring? About protecting? About 
preventing? About repression? The situations chosen and evoked by the panellists are all 
expressions, or at the very least symptoms, of the anxieties of a felt contemporary or 
forthcoming ‘control society’, announced by Deleuze,8 and/or of Becks’s “Risk Society.”9  
All in all, all of our panellists have expressed a certain reserve it not ‘complaints’ against this 
‘control society’. The most telling is their demand for more ‘human’ relationships, for more 
social harmony. What is at stake here is the issue of the man-machine. Many regret an 
idealised past era, with no computer, no television, no everyday technologies. Back then, time 
was better spent discussing, playing, or at fulfilling diverse tasks all engendering of better-
quality relations that were more human, more authentic. It is ‘technology’ that would be the 
cause behind this social deliting, this abusive individualism, leading out to an additional dose 
of deep anxiety between persons. ‘Technology’ would also be the cause to massive job losses, 
machines replacing man in its productive function; machines being incapable of humanity, 
they would be at the core of the crumbling down of social relations and the growing social 
atomisation. Lastly, technologies and technical apparatuses such as those enacted in the 
‘Web-TV’ scenario are also pointed at for ‘intruding and affecting personal intelligence’, 
leading to uniformisation of thought and a reductive smoothing of choices and preferences. 
What is advocated and pointed at here is the paradoxical contemporary taste right for each to 
preserve his/her particularism. It is this emphasis on the freedom to choose and preferences 
that highlights individualism as common value among our panellists. 
                                                 
8
 Deleuze, G., « Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle », in L’autre journal, n° l, mai 1990. 
9
 Beck, U., « Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity », New Delhi: Sage, 1992. 
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3. The Scenarios : A Contrasted Assessment 
3.1. ‘Safety and Security’ Scenario (SSS) 
The ‘Safety and Security’ Scenario, herafter ‘SSS’, is that which has, in the same time, 
generated the most consensus and critical debates among our panellists, especially as regards 
to its evaluation. On this particular level, there were quite some divergences. If all agree on 
that such SSS is useful as regards to ‘safety’ issues, opinions diverge as regards to the aimed 
public and audiences – at the very least as regards to the identification of the latter. The 
‘majorities’ will mention at street gangs as the targeted groups; the ‘common’ will point out 
that anyone may become the target of such SSS; the ‘precarious’ will speak out of émigrés 
and refugees, coloured people, roofless people – or ‘Sans Domicile Fixe’, ‘SDF’ in French 
jargon –, poor people, …     
Positive consequences of the scenario are mostly found as regards to the assistance to 
surveillance, counter-terrorism security, to prevention. The usage of such SSS also has been 
strictly regulated to be acceptable. Still there remain some strong critiques against this SSS.  
In this respect, the ‘precarious’ and the ‘common’ highlight that even if a camera is present on 
premises, it is not sufficient to stop people from falling. In some sense, the aimed purpose of 
caring for people’s safety is not achieved. Then what is the real purpose? Towards the 
claimed purpose, would it not be better to increase the number of security and safety staff 
around? Also, the installation of such systems does it not mean a lesser number of safety and 
security staff, does it? 
On this issue, the Arlon prison staff has noticed the multiple functions that cameras may take. 
If cameras are indeed there to assisting surveillance staff, what stops that the collected images 
and data not be used against this very staff? On the one hand, surveillance staff do not have 
access to personal data and images, and nothing guarantees that these may not be used against 
them. Moreover, they emphasise, these devices induce social paranoïa atmosphere, of which 
huma nd professional relationships suffer. They speak out of anxieties of a world in which 
everyone is recorded in files and wherein information may at any time be crossed-checked 
with other ones and made contribute to non-retroactive profiling.  
All in all, all our panellists have formulated some questioning as regards to the notion and 
definition of normality and abnormality enacted as left out to the subjective appreciation to its 
user (relatif et aléatoire), similarly as for the confusing polysemic notion of safety and 
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security. What is an abnormal behaviour? Will the system be flexible enough to integrate all 
the variants of ‘normal’ variations, for instance a running child, or are we to worry of rather 
constraining systems? How are engineers to calibrate? On which basis? All panellists also 
tend to ask questions as regards to their personal data, the collect of these, and their likely 
usage towards other ends.  
As regards to the targeted groups to control, the ‘precarious’ and the ‘common’ all seem to 
think that this kind of technology is likely to lead to discriminations, for they tend, they claim, 
to weaken social bounds and relationships, and take as a target poor people, and weaker 
individuals. Moreover, they argue, video-surveillance also implies a social de-
responsabilising process; it is likely that the belief will grow that cameras will take over the 
collective responsibility of the care for accidents in public spaces. They also note that the 
installing of cameras in large public spaces lead to the feeling of a paranoiac, repressive 
society in which ‘risk-zero’ situations are a priori precluded. 
More or less all our panellists have noted too that there are risks as regards to privacy and 
intimacy intrusions due to the presence of cameras. They comment on that ‘the eye looks out 
for the observing camera’ and vice versa, and that h-behaviours get affected, moulded by that 
feeling of being observed. For them, it is impossible to resist the attraction of these 
technologies; one feels forced to endure them.  
3.2. ‘Marketing’ Scenario 
The assessment of this ‘Marketing’ Scenario, hereafter ‘MS’, by our panellists has been quite 
varied and contrasted. In this case, the contrasts do not seem to be shaped up by our 
categorisation between ‘majorities’, ‘precarious’, and ‘common’. A certain consensus seems 
to emerge however on the issue that this kind of technology may induce the consumption of 
products that are neither crucial not even remotely needed, and, more problematically, the 
‘formatting’ and ‘standardisation’ of their preferences and tastes. Risks with profiling arre 
perceived as such and all panellists highlight the potential threat to individual freedom. A risk 
of socio-economic discrimination is also perceived, this by the three categories. The 
awareness that such MS system provides little if no retroactivity is important. There is a clear 
fear to become manipulated by an opaque technological system, as well as of privacy and 
intimacy intrusion. No panellist has mentioned any kind of usefulness or necessity for this MS 
scenario. 
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Instead, the ‘majorities’ have highlighted the fact that this MS scenario may cause dommage 
to the process of shopping itself, as a human activity, which, in their understanding, consists 
in wandering freely round between products shelves and explore the products on display.  
Discussions also highlighted the issue of the little relevance of public funding of such 
technologies. Another point made was also about how such MS ought not to be used as a way 
to control employees, and of protection against thefts. Some panellists however see some 
positive impacts for producers or managers of large-scale stores. Still, all in all, all panellists 
have under questioning the potential little practical usefulness of of the scenario. 
3.3. ‘Web-TV’ Scenario 
To start with, the ‘precarious’ and the ‘common’ have highlighted the issue that this scenario 
pre-implied the regular access to a computer as well as an internet connection. This means for 
that the ‘Digital Divide’ is no myth and has real practical implication. For instance, prisoners 
pointed at their non-access to the internet. More in general, if panellists see in this WTS a 
potential help towards more comfortable use of Web-TV programmes, many rather highlight 
the risks of social atomisation, crumbling and damage to social relationships and, as with the 
MS commented above, of ‘formatting’ and ‘standardisation’ of preferences and tastes. Overall 
comments pointed at the technology as intrusive. Comments also mentioned that emotions are 
not universal, and some fear of having one’s preferences cast, typified, and potentially 
manipulated towards ends other than personal comfort. No panellist found any particular 
practical usefulness to the scenario.  
More tellingly, panellists have developed some questioning on issues of consent. To what 
extent was consent to such WTS fully informed? How does one know what is actually 
subscribed to? Are we sure that terms and conditions will be respected, interestingly telling on 
the fear of risk of manipulation? To close, as for the MS scenario, panellists havechallenged 
have put down questioning on the limited real – as opposed to presumed – usefulness this 
WTS may bring.  
4. Recommendations 
We have asked all our participants to formulate some recommendations towards EU 
authorities as regards to, first, issues of public funding and financing, second, the policy 
making that should regulate the technologies, and, lastly, to technologies per se. 
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4.1. About the Public Funding and Financing  
On the issue of public financing, the first main comment from our participants relates to the 
pertinence and relevance of structural financing of the ‘Marketing’ and ‘Web-TV’ scenarios, 
in as far as they rather conceive these as benfiting the private and not the public sector. Why 
do European scientific policies support such project? This seems to have shocked a large 
number of participants as these scenarios do not aim at reaching any kind of ‘common good’ 
ideal. Only the ‘Safety and Security’ scenario seems to have some kind of legitimacy among 
our panelists on this issue of financing. The second comment relates to the kind of contents 
supported by European funding schemes. The ‘precarious’ and ‘common’ would advocate 
better financing for healthcare, culture and education, as well as violence prevention projects, 
which is why, they think, policy makers turn to videosurveillance systems. 
4.2. About the Political Regulation 
On the regulation, the three panels seem to share the same requirements.  
 The legal and ethical regulation of videosurveillance systems should be more 
explained and popularized amongst the population 
 The creation of overseeing control organism as regards to the usage and 
exploitation of personal data, with some advocacy that such control body would be 
made of citizens. 
 The privileging of human capital as regards to technologies, the need of more local 
policing for instance. 
 The possibility to gain easy access to stored personal data, and to act on these 
latter (possibility of deletion, procedures to make these invisible) 
4.3. About the Technology  
Lastly, as regards to recommendations related to technologies per se and their development, 
our panellists seem to advocate and/or emphasise:  
 Research aimed the ‘common good’, and individual welfare 
 The need to enforce the respect of regulations as regards to the design and 
production of technologies. 
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Conclusion (to be completed) 
 
 
